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Abstract
In the present essay I investigate Polanyi’s main arguments for academic freedom. Aca-
demic and political freedom are closely related to each other: if state takes control over 
science, it will lead to the collapse of freedom itself in the whole society. His arguments 
against totalitarianism rely on his anti-positivist philosophy of science. He diagnoses totali-
tarianism as a denial of academic freedom which is based on a pragmatist view of science 
and instrumentalist interpretation of moral values. Polanyi’s idea of science is a spiritual, 
idealistic description of a community of free intellectuals who are passionately committed 
to seeking the truth and have an autonomous community with its own rules and autonomous 
direction. Seeking the truth for its own sake is the essential goal of science, which can be 
accomplished only if it remains free from political, ideological and economical influences. 
I will argue that Polanyi’s insights can still be relevant today, when science can become 
an instrument of profit-oriented practical needs instead of seeking the truth itself, and the 
humanities (including philosophy) are often considered unnecessary.
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1.
Michael	Polanyi’s	scientific	work	and	his	contribution	to	philosophy	of	sci-
ence	are	widely	known,	but	the	connections	between	his	political	views	and	
his	theory	of	knowledge	are	still	unexplored	in	many	aspects.	Nevertheless,	it	
seems	obvious	that	Polanyi’s	philosophy	of	science	was	motivated	by	his	own	
moral	and	political	philosophy,	namely	his	ideas	about	the	role	of	scientists	as	
free	intellectuals	in	a	democratic	society.	Polanyi	himself	declares	that	know-
ing	and	morality	interweave	in	many	ways.	Firstly,	knowledge	inevitably	has	
a	moral	character,	since	justification	of	the	claims	of	science	is	not	based	on	
impersonal,	 abstract	methodological	norms,	but	 tacit	 rules	 committed	by	 a	
community	of	scientists.	Secondly,	our	conception	of	the	role	and	meaning	of	
science	is	deeply	rooted	in	our	commitments	to	moral	values,	such	as	freedom	
and	justice.
*
This	 essay	 is	 based	 on	my	 conference	 talk,	
“Michael	 Polanyi’s	 Post-critical	 Epistemo-
logy	 and	 the	Moral	 Dimension	 of	 Science”	
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Tihamér	Margitay	 for	 his	 support	 and	 com-
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Polanyi	alludes	to	his	conversation	with	Bukharin	in	1935	about	the	super-
fluity	of	pure	science	as	a	decisive	episode	of	his	intellectual	life.1	Bukharin	
argued	from	a	Marxist	standpoint	that	the	ultimate	aim	of	science	is	to	serve	
practical,	 economical	needs	 and	 interests.	Arguing	 for	pure	 science,	which	
seeks	the	truth	for	its	own	sake,	is	not	only	an	old-fashioned,	but	also	a	futile	
idea.	Of	course,	this	view	relies	on	the	communist	conception	of	central	eco-
nomic	planning:	like	production	and	distribution	of	goods,	scientific	research	
must	be	centrally	directed	and	controlled	by	political	authorities.
In	1938	the	British	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	Science	founded	a	new	
division	which	aimed	to	create	social	guidance	for	the	progress	of	science.	The	
idea	of	planning	science	became	relatively	popular,	but	after	1945	the	move-
ment	lost	its	significance.2	Nevertheless,	we	are	tempted	to	say	that	nowadays	
it	is	a	more	and	more	widely	adopted	view	that	science	must	serve	the	public	
good,	thus	state	should	take	control	above	scientists	in	some	extent.
It	is	worth	to	make	a	clarification.	The	term	‘science’	might	have	a	broad	and	
a	narrow	meaning	as	well.	Basically,	Polanyi’s	arguments	focus	on	pure	and	
natural	sciences,	but	his	conception	might	be	also	applied	to	any	systematic,	
intellectual	activity	which	aims	the	truth	(including	humanities).	We	will	back	
to	this	issue	later.	
The	basic	questions	are:	what	role	should	science	play	in	society,	and	why	
should	science	be	funded?	The	popular	view	is	that	science	must	have	practi-
cal	benefits	for	society	and	serve	the	“common	good”	(whatever	that	would	
mean).	This	view	goes	hand	in	hand	with	utilitarianism,	according	to	which	
the	goal	of	“understanding	nature”	is	subordinated	to	economical	goods	and	
public	welfare.
In	 contrast	 to	Marxist	 ideologists	 and	 some	of	 his	 contemporaries	 in	Brit-
ain	(for	example,	John	Desmond	Bernal)	Polanyi	claims	that	science	is	es-
sentially	a	truth-seeking	practice.	His	idea	of	science	is	a	spiritual,	idealistic	
description	of	a	community	of	free	intellectuals,	who	are	passionately	com-
mitted	to	seeking	the	truth.	Polanyi	argues	that	science	does	not	need	to	have	
special	obligations	to	society,	since	it	is	only	concerned	with	the	deeper	un-
derstanding	of	nature.	Seeking	the	truth	for	its	own	sake	is	the	essential	goal	
of	science,	and	it	can	follow	and	accomplish	this	goal	only	if	it	remains	free	
from	every	social,	economic	and	other	external	interest	and	influence.	Conse-
quently,	scientists	must	have	an	autonomous	community	with	their	own	rules	
and	autonomous	“government”.
In	my	essay	I	would	like	to	present	and	examine	Polanyi’s	views	about	free	
science	and	society.	I	will	summarize	and	analyse	his	main	arguments	against	
centrally	planned	science,	and	for	the	idea	of	free	republic	of	scientists.	I	will	
also	present	some	of	his	main	economic	arguments	regarding	free	market	and	
society.	Perhaps	Polanyi’s	ideas	about	academic	freedom	and	the	republic	of	
science	seem	to	be	old-fashioned	now.	One	might	argue	there	is	a	false	di-
chotomy	here:	even	though	the	idea	of	centrally	planned	science	is	untenable,	
it	does	not	follow	that	Polanyi’s	idealistic	conception	of	academic	freedom	is	
the	best	possible	alternative.	Nonetheless,	I	will	argue	that	though	the	main	
target	of	his	argumentation	is	the	totalitarian	control	of	science,	he	also	calls	
attention	 to	possible	dangers	of	controlled	science	 in	capitalist,	democratic	
societies.	Therefore,	we	have	a	good	 reason	 to	 think	 that	his	views	can	be	
relevant	today	as	well.3	Of	course,	I	consider	some	difficulties	and	possible	
objections	against	his	views.	All	in	all,	I	think	we	should	take	Polanyi’s	warn-
ings	of	the	dangers	of	economic	influence	on	science	seriously,	even	though	
his	main	conclusions	should	be	modified	and	put	in	a	more	moderate	form.
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2.
Polanyi	makes	clear	 that	his	conception	of	free	science	has	strong	political	
implications:	his	idea	of	academic	freedom	serves	as	the	basis	for	his	political	
idea	of	freedom.4	The	free	society	of	scientists	(the	“republic	of	science”)	is	a	
model	for	a	free	society	of	autonomous	individuals.	Therefore,	his	warnings	
of	the	dangers	to	academic	freedom	in	totalitarian	states	(in	Nazi	Germany	
and	 the	Soviet	Union)	 should	 not	 be	 seen	merely	 as	 a	 theoretical	 explica-
tion	about	the	features	of	scientific	research.	He	argues	that	if	the	state	takes	
control	over	science	(and	economy),	and	science	becomes	an	instrument	of	
political-ideological	goals,	it	inevitably	leads	to	the	collapse	of	freedom	itself	
in	the	whole	society.5
Modern	democracies	value	freedom	very	high;	however,	according	to	Polanyi,	
these	considerations	are	mostly	based	on	an	individualistic,	liberal	conception	
of	freedom	which	should	be	reconsidered	in	order	to	convincingly	defend	aca-
demic	freedom	against	its	enemies.	He	argues	that	attempting	to	defend	free	
science	on	utilitarian	or	sceptical	grounds	undermines	what	they	are	invoked	to	
defend.	Therefore,	Polanyi	does	not	seek	to	endorse	free	society	by	appealing	
to	the	importance	of	private	liberty,	rather,	he	tries	to	support	it	by	appealing	
to	positive,	public	liberty	which	involves	our	pursuit	of	supposedly	objective	
ideals,	such	as	truth,	justice,	beauty.	In	»Perils	of	Inconsistency«	he	offers	a	de-
tailed	narrative	about	modernity	and	concludes	that	the	collapse	of	freedom	in	
the	20th	century	totalitarian	states	was	an	outcome	of	an	internal	contradiction	
in	the	classical,	liberal	conception	of	liberty.	In	other	words,	denying	reality	of	
transcendent,	moral	ideas	opens	a	door	to	totalitarianism.	He	writes:
“We	can	see	how	the	philosophies	which	guided	these	revolutions	and	destroyed	liberty	wherever	
they	prevailed,	were	originally	justified	by	the	anti-authoritarian	and	sceptical	formula	of	liberty.	
They	were	indeed	anti-authoritarian	and	sceptical	to	the	extreme.	(…)	If	thought	and	reason	are	not-
hing	by	themselves,	then	it	is	meaningless	to	demand	that	thought	be	set	free.	(…)	The	assumption	
of	universal	standards	of	reason	was	implicit	in	the	hopes	of	Enlightenment	and	the	philosophies	
which	denied	the	existence	of	such	standards	denied	therefore	the	foundations	of	all	these	hopes.”6
1
Michael	Polanyi,	Science, Faith and Society,	
Phoenix	 Books,	 The	 University	 of	 Chicago	
Press,	Chicago,	1964,	p.	8.
2
Ibid.,	p.	7.
3
His	warning	is	unambiguous:	“Even	in	coun-
tries	where	science	is	still	free	we	are	experi-
encing	today	a	weakening	of	the	principles	of	
scientific	autonomy.	(…)	Our	analysis	seems	
to	leave	no	doubt	that	if	this	kind	of	movement	
prevailed	 and	 developed	 further:	 if	 attempts	
to	suppress	the	autonomy	of	science,	such	as	
have	been	made	in	Russia	since	1932,	became	
world-wide	and	were	persisted	in	for	time,	the	
result	could	only	be	a	total	destruction	of	sci-
ence	 and	 academic	 life.”	 Michael	 Polanyi,	
“Self-Government	 of	 Science”,	 in:	 Michael	
Polanyi,	The Logic of Liberty,	Routledge	and	
Kegan	Paul	Ltd,	London,	1951,	p.	67.
4
“Academic	 freedom	of	 course	never	 an	 iso-
lated	phenomenon.	It	can	exist	only	in	a	free	
society;	for	the	principles	underlying	it	are	the	
same	on	which	the	most	essential	liberties	of	
society	as	a	whole	are	founded.”	Michael	Po-
lanyi,	 “Foundations	of	Academic	Freedom”,	
in:	The Logic of Liberty,	p.	45.
5
“Public	liberty	can	be	fully	upheld	as	an	aim	
in	 itself,	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 the	method	 for	 the	
social	management	of	purposes	that	are	aims	
in	 themselves.	Freedom	of	 science,	 freedom	
worship,	 freedom	of	 thought	 in	 general,	 are	
public	institutions	by	which	society	opens	to	
its	members	the	opportunity	for	serving	aims	
that	are	purposes	by	themselves.	By	establish-
ing	 these	 freedoms,	society	constitutes	 itself	
as	 a	 community	 of	 people	 believing	 in	 the	
validity	and	power	of	things	of	the	mind	and	
in	 our	 obligation	 to	 these	 things.”	 Michael	
Polanyi,	“Manageability	of	Social	Tasks”,	in:	
The Logic of Liberty,	p.	193.
6
Michael	 Polanyi,	 “Perils	 of	 Inconsistency”,	
in:	The Logic of Liberty,	pp.	102–103.
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The	concept	of	freedom	is	worth	examining	 in	more	detail.	Polanyi	distin-
guishes	two	opposite	theories	of	freedom,	and	rejects	them	both	by	arguing	
in	favour	of	his	own	conception.	The	first	is	the	classical	liberal	concept	of	
freedom.	Everybody	has	a	 right	 to	do	anything	he	or	 she	wants	as	 long	as	
he	or	she	does	not	impede	the	same	right	of	others.	Polanyi	claims	that	this	
conception	is	usually	connected	with	utilitarianism,	according	to	which	the	
freedom	of	individuals	is	an	important	requirement	of	the	greatest	happiness	
of	the	society.7	The	second	one	is	a	kind	of	simplified	Kantian	conception	of	
freedom	which	says	that	freedom	is	a	liberation	from	personal	ends	by	obey-
ing	impersonal	obligations.	Polanyi	argues,	this	idea	of	freedom	could	easily	
support	 totalitarian	 ideologies,	 if	we	 add	 that	 the	 State,	 the	Nation,	 or	 the	
Party	is	a	trustee	of	the	common	good	of	society,	therefore,	it	is	the	source	of	
moral	obligations	which	are	compulsory	for	the	individuals.8
In	contrast	to	these	theories,	academic	freedom	can	be	characterized	simply	as	
“the	right	to	choose	one’s	own	problem	of	investigation,	to	conduct	research	
free	from	any	outside	control,	and	to	teach	one’s	subject	in	the	light	of	one’s	
own	 opinions.”9	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 Polanyi’s	 own	 conception	 of	 freedom	 is	 a	
middle	course	position	between	the	individualistic	and	the	obligation	theory	
of	 freedom.	Scientists	 as	 individuals	must	 judge	 and	make	decisions	 inde-
pendently,	however,	not	separately	from	others.	These	judgements	are	about	
scientific	merit,	validity,	plausibility	of	theories,	academic	appointments,	and	
other	things.	On	the	other	hand,	these	judgements,	opinions,	and	decisions	are	
guided	by	norms	and	values	which	are	generally	adopted	by	scientists.
Polanyi	invokes	some	widely	known	examples	of	planned	and	controlled	sci-
ence	in	totalitarian	states.	The	Lysenko-case	is	probably	the	best	known	story.	
During	the	1930’s,	the	reliable	theory	of	genetic	heredity	(“Mendelism”)	was	
rejected	in	the	Soviet	Union	for	ideological	reasons:	genetics	was	declared	as	
not	consistent	with	Marxism-Leninism.	Instead,	as	part	of	the	official	ideol-
ogy,	Michurin’s	dubious	and	unsupported	views	were	endorsed	by	Michurin’s	
follower,	the	chief	ideologist	Lysenko.	His	suspicious	method	of	“vegetative	
hybridization”	 became	 wide-spread	 and	 obligatory.	 Critics,	 including	 the	
great	geneticist	Valilov	were	put	 to	 silence	and	dismissed.	Vavilov	himself	
was	imprisoned	and	probably	died	in	jail	under	unclarified	circumstances.10
What	makes	Polanyi’s	account	 interesting	 is	 that	he	 identifies	 the	 implicit,	
theoretical	presumptions	of	 totalitarian	 ideologies,	 first	of	all,	 the	denial	of	
distinction	between	pure	and	applied	science.	As	we	have	seen,	Polanyi	en-
dorses	pure	science:	the	aim	of	science	is	seeking	the	truth	for	its	own	sake.	
Of	 course,	Polanyi	 acknowledges	 the	 importance	of	 applied	 science	 (engi-
neering,	medicine,	etc.),	but	he	argues	that	pure	science	does	not	need	to	serve	
practical	(economic,	social,	political)	interests	and	needs,	since	it	is	the	sci-
entists’	task	and	responsibility	to	choose	their	own	problems,	methods,	and	
decide	about	scientific	truth.	Polanyi	provides	examples	from	the	history	of	
mechanics	and	the	history	of	artificial	lightning.	He	says	that	physics	has	its	
own	problems	and	aims.	Great	scientists,	like	Copernicus,	Kepler,	Newton	or	
Maxwell	did	not	really	care	about	the	practical	application	of	their	theories,	
their	 sole	 aim	was	 to	 give	 a	 deeper	 understanding	of	 nature.	On	 the	 other	
hand,	technological	development	is	about	economical	and	practical	needs:	the	
inventors’	aim	was	to	produce	light	cheaply	and	efficiently.11
The	Marxist	ideologist	Mitin’s	words	could	not	disagree	more	with	Polanyi’s	
view:
“We	have	no	gulf	between	theory	and	practice,	we	have	no	Chinese	wall	between	scientific	achi-
evements	and	practical	activity.	Every	genuine	discovery,	every	genuine	scientific	achievement	
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is	with	us	translated	into	practice	(…)	Soviet	biologists,	geneticists	must	understand	dialectical	
and	scientific	materialism	and	learn	to	apply	the	dialectical	method	into	their	scientific	work.	
Verbal,	formal	acceptance	of	dialectical	materialism	is	not	wanted.”12
It	is	worth	taking	into	account	that	Polanyi’s	diagnosis	of	the	two	totalitarian	
states,	the	Soviet	Union	and	Nazi	Germany,	is	connected	to	his	views	about	
the	 responses	 to	 scepticism	and	naturalism	 in	modern	philosophy.	Accord-
ing	to	his	narrative,	at	 the	 initial	period	of	 totalitarianism	(for	 instance,	for	
Robespierre)	traditional	moral	values	are	reinterpreted	in	a	utilitarian	scheme:	
violence	and	terror	play	an	instrumental	role	for	the	sake	of	humanitarian	ob-
jectives.	Due	to	the	instrumentalist-utilitarian	conception	of	science,	as	well	
as	other	institutions,	like	jury,	traditional	values	such	as	truth	or	justice	are	
neglected	or	radically	reinterpreted.	Social	institutions	(such	as,	jury	and	sci-
entific	community)	play	a	more	and	more	submissive	role.	At	the	final	stage	
of	totalitarianism,	the	real	aim	of	political	authorities	is	not	to	surmount	pov-
erty	and	injustice	by	bringing	humanity	to	a	utopian	world:	they	use	violence	
for	its	own	sake,	and	power	becomes	the	ultimate	goal.13
However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	Polanyi	clearly	declares	 that	coercion	
and	violence	 in	a	certain	degree	are	necessary	for	 the	functioning	of	every	
society.	Even	a	democratic	society	must	inevitably	use	its	power	and	mastery	
in	order	to	maintain	law	and	order	and	protect	citizens’	 life	and	property.14	
But	the	aim	of	a	free	society	is	to	ensure	conditions	in	which	free	individu-
als	are	able	 to	recognize	and	pursue	genuine	moral	and	 intellectual	values.	
Therefore,	contrary	to	the	totalitarian	state,	enforcement	of	law	plays	a	merely	
instrumental	role.	Scientific	research	depends	on	academic	freedom,	and	aca-
demic	freedom	is	an	essential	value	of	a	free	society.
3.
In	this	section	I	offer	a	summary	of	the	main	requirements	of	academic	free-
dom.	Some	of	Polanyi’s	key	concepts	are:	self-coordination, mutual adjust-
ment, tradition, scientific authority, and tacit judgements.	First	of	all,	let	us	
have	a	closer	 look	at	 the	notion	of	self-coordination.	There	are	simple	and	
	 7
M.	Polanyi,	 “Foundations	of	Academic	Fre-
edom”,	pp.	32–33.
	 8
Ibid.,	p.	33.
	 9
Ibid.
10
Polanyi	provides	a	detailed	description	of	the	
Lysenko-case.	 See:	 M.	 Polanyi,	 “Self-Gov-
ernment	of	Science”,	pp.	59–65.
11
For	 his	 detailed	 argumentation	 in	 favour	 of	
the	distinction	see:	Michael	Polanyi,	“Scien-
ce	and	Welfare”,	in:	The Logic of Liberty,	pp.	
68–83.
12
Polanyi	quotes	Mitin.	See:	M.	Polanyi,	“Self-
Government	of	Science”,	p.	62.
13
Polanyi	describes	this	process	in	terms	of	his	
conception	 of	 moral	 inversion.	 In	 “Beyond	
Nihilism”	he	writes:	“Robespierre’s	terror	had	
justified	itself	by	its	noble	aspirations;	Marx	
refused	 such	 justification	 and	 left	 violence	
alone	as	the	path	of	scientific	Socialism.	(…)	
This	is	moral	inversion:	a	condition	in	which	
high	moral	purpose	operates	only	as	the	hid-
den	force	of	an	openly	declared	inhumanity”	
See:	Michael	Polanyi,	“Beyond	Nihilism”,	in:	
Marjorie	 Grene	 (ed.),	 Knowing and Being. 
Essays by Michael Polanyi,	The	University	of	
Chicago	Press,	1969,	p.	16.
14
“Though	 men	 be	 harmoniously	 guided	 by	
their	agreed	convictions,	they	must	yet	form	
a	government	to	enforce	their	purpose.	Civic	
culture	 can	 flourish	 only	 thanks	 to	 physical	
coercion.	 It	 is	 sown	 in	corruption.”	Michael	
Polanyi,	 Personal Knowledge. Towards a 
Post-Critical Philosophy,	London,	Routledge	
&	Kegan	Paul	Ltd.,	1962,	p.	238.
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uniform	 tasks	where	 every	 individual	works	on	 the	 same	 task	 in	 the	 same	
manner.	Polanyi’s	 two	 important	 examples	 are	 a	 group	of	women	 shelling	
peas	and	a	team	of	chess	players.	Obviously,	the	total	number	of	peas	shelled	
or	 the	 number	 of	 games	won	will	 not	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 fact	whether	 the	
individuals	are	isolated	or	not.15	However,	there	are	tasks	where	a	complete	
isolation	 of	 the	 individuals	would	 inhibit	 progress	 and	 prevent	 the	 resolu-
tion	of	the	task.	Scientists	might	work	totally	separately	from	each	other,	and	
everybody	might	develop	his	or	her	own	problem	without	relying	on	others,	
but	in	this	case,	without	further	information	and	feedback	from	others,	no	new	
problems	would	arise,	and	this	would	paralyse	the	progress	of	research	within	
a	short	time.
Polanyi	distinguishes	between	 two	kinds	of	coordination:	self-coordination	
and	centrally directed coordination.	These	abstract	principles	are	manifested	
in	many	concrete	systems.	Self-coordination	is	a	mutual	adjustment	of	inde-
pendent	agents,	when	every	individual	pays	attention	and	adjusts	to	others’	
operations	within	 the	 same	 system.	 Every	 agent	 acts	 freely,	 following	 her	
own	 initiative,	 but	 in	 the	 sight	 of	 others,	 responding	 to	other’s	 operations.	
Every	single	modification	of	the	system	takes	into	account	all	other	modifica-
tions.16
Let	me	illustrate	this	abstract	theory	by	one	of	Polanyi’s	favourite	examples,	
the	solution	of	a	jigsaw	puzzle.	What	is	the	most	efficient	way	to	solve	a	very	
large	and	complex	puzzle?	Polanyi	argues	that	even	if	we	have	a	legion	of	
puzzle-solvers,	if	they	work	separately	on	different	pieces	of	the	puzzle,	the	
result	would	 not	 be	 satisfying.	 If	 they	were	 subordinated	 into	 a	 hierarchic	
body,	where	a	central	authority	directed	their	actions,	the	initial	cooperation	
between	them	would	be	paralysed.	Their	work	will	be	most	effective	if	they	
cooperate.	Everybody	works	on	putting	the	pieces	of	puzzle	together	in	the	
sight	of	others,	that	is	to	say,	every	time	a	piece	is	fitted	in,	all	the	others	will	
think	about	the	next	step	in	the	light	of	others’	advancement.17
Polanyi	claims	that	self-coordination	is	guided	by	an	invisible	hand.18	There	
is	no	central	direction,	in	other	words,	none	of	the	steps	taken	are	predeter-
mined	or	known.	Of	course,	central	planning	can	be	efficient	in	terms	of	some	
organizations,	 prominently	 the	 army.	 In	 this	 case	 a	 hierarchic	 organization	
could	effectively	coordinate	individuals.	However,	in	science	and	other	tasks,	
such	as	puzzle-solving,	central	planning	cannot	work.	The	main	reason	why	
mutual	self-coordination	is	more	effective	than	central	planning	in	terms	of	
these	tasks	is	that	the	end-result	of	the	tasks	is	unknown.	We	might	see	the	
solving	of	a	puzzle	or	a	scientific	problem	as	a	series	of	decisions	where	no-
body	knows	or	expects	what	the	final	solution	will	be.	Therefore,	puzzle	solv-
ers	and	scientists	can	only	make	progress	step	by	step,	and	each	consecutive	
step	must	be	decided	locally	by	competent	individuals	who	continually	keep	
an	eye	on	others’	decisions.19
The	most	efficient	way	to	make	scientific	progress	is	to	let	scientists	work	on	
their	own	problems	and	proceed	following	their	own,	independent	decisions	
by	adjusting	not	to	external	influences	but	to	other	scientists.	Consequently,	
every	attempt	of	central	planning	paralyses	the	advancement	of	science.	Po-
lanyi	writes:	 “You	can	kill	 or	mutilate	 the	 advance	of	 science,	 you	 cannot	
shape	it.	For	it	can	advance	only	by	essentially	unpredictable	steps,	pursuing	
problems	of	its	own,	and	the	practical	benefits	of	these	advances	will	be	inci-
dental	and	hence	doubly	unpredictable.”20
The	free	market	is	another	obvious	example	of	mutual	adjustment.	It	is	not	
hard	to	see	how	the	invisible	hand	of	self-coordination	guides	the	producers	
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and	consumers	in	the	free	market.	The	community	of	scientists	is	organized	
in	a	way	which	is	similar	to	the	social	order	of	a	free	society.	Their	operations	
are	based	on	economic	principles	which	control	the	production	and	selling	the	
goods	in	a	free	market.21	Polanyi	utilizes	Adam	Smith’s	classical	theory	and	
argues	that	in	science	we	can	find	the	same	economic	principles,	namely	that	
the	decisions	of	scientists	must	produce	the	highest	“benefit”	by	using	lim-
ited	intellectual	and	material	capacities.	Scientists	must	make	decisions	about	
what	problem	is	promising	and	worth	for	further	investigation,	and	what	is	
uninteresting	or	simply	meaningless.	Moreover,	scientists	judge	other	scien-
tists’	results	and	proposed	conclusions,	they	evaluate	papers,	decide	whether	
they	should	be	published	or	not,	and	make	decisions	about	appointments.	Po-
lanyi	writes:	“For	his	decisions	are	designed	to	produce	the	highest	possible	
result	by	the	use	of	limited	stock	of	intellectual	and	material	resources.	The	
scientist	fulfils	this	purpose	by	choosing	a	problem	that	is	neither	too	hard	nor	
too	easy	to	him.	(…)	The	line	the	scientist	must	choose	turns	out,	therefore,	
to	be	that	of	greatest	ego-involvement;	it	 is	 the	line	of	greatest	excitement,	
sustaining	the	most	intense	attention	and	effort	of	thought.”22
These	decisions	are	rooted	in	professional	standards	which	have	been	adopted	
by	scientists	over	generations.	As	we	will	see,	Polanyi’s	main	thesis	is	that	
these	standards	cannot	be	strictly	formalized.	In	the	following	section	we	take	
a	closer	look	at	Polanyi’s	views	about	the	values	of	scientific	community.
4.
According	to	Polanyi,	the	second	requirement	of	academic	freedom	and	the	
proper	functioning	of	science	is	that	scientists	submit	themselves	to	obligations	
which	become	their	guidance	in	seeking	the	truth.	Polanyi	mentions	several	
professional	standards	which	are	obligatory	for	all	scientists	and	necessary	for	
judging	scientific	merit,	and	helping	scientists	to	reject	unscientific,	dubious	
theories.	The	 three	chief	values	are	plausibility,	scientific merit (including:	
accuracy,	systematic	importance,	intrinsic	interest)	and	originality.23
15
Michael	Polanyi,	“The	Republic	of	Science:	
Its	 Political	 and	 Economic	 Theory”,	 in:	 M.	
Grene	 (ed.),	Knowing and Being. Essays by 
Michael Polanyi, pp.	49–50.
16
See:	M.	Polanyi,	“Foundations	of	Academic	
Freedom”,	pp.	34–36,	and	M.	Polanyi,	“The	
Republic	 of	 Science:	 Its	 Political	 and	 Eco-
nomic	Theory”,	pp.	49–53.
17
M.	Polanyi,	 “Foundations	of	Academic	Fre-
edom”,	pp.	34–36.
18
M.	Polanyi,	“The	Republic	of	Science:	Its	Po-
litical	and	Economic	Theory”,	p.	51.
19
“(…)	if	the	scientists	of	the	world	are	viewed	
as	a	 team	setting	out	 to	explore	 the	existing	
openings	for	discovery,	it	is	assumed	that	their	
efforts	will	be	efficiently	co-ordinated	if	only	
each	 is	 left	 to	 follow	his	 own	 inclinations.”	
M.	Polanyi,	“Foundations	of	Academic	Free-
dom”,	p.	34.
20
M.	Polanyi,	“The	Republic	of	Science:	Its	Po-
litical	and	Economic	Theory”,	p.	59.
21
He	writes:	“I	am	suggesting,	in	fact,	that	the	
co-ordinating	functions	of	the	market	are	but	
a	 special	 case	 of	 co-ordination	 by	 mutual	
adjustment.	In	the	case	of	science,	adjustment	
takes	 place	 by	 taking	 note	 of	 the	 published	
results	 of	 other	 scientists;	while	 in	 the	 case	
of	the	market,	mutual	adjustment	is	mediated	
by	 a	 system	 of	 prices	 broadcasting	 current	
exchange	relations,	which	make	supply	meet	
demand.”	M.	Polanyi,	“The	Republic	of	Sci-
ence:	Its	Political	and	Economic	Theory”,	p.	
52.
22
Ibid.,	p.	52.
23
Ibid.,	pp.	53–54.
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Like	Kuhn,	Polanyi	also	points	out	that	the	“internal	tension”	between	con-
formity	and	originality	is	an	indispensable	element	of	scientific	research.	He	
writes:
“The	professional	standards	of	science	must	impose	a	framework	of	discipline	and	at	the	same	
time	encourage	rebellion	against	it.	They	must	demand	that,	in	order	to	be	taken	seriously,	an	
investigation	should	largely	conform	to	the	currently	predominant	beliefs	about	nature	of	things,	
while	allowing	that	in	order	to	be	original	it	may	some	extent	go	against	these.”24
According	to	Polanyi,	scientists	have	a	basically	conservative	institute.	They	
are	cautious	about	radical	changes.	Due	to	its	traditionalism	science	could	de-
fend	itself	from	frauds	and	daydreamers.	On	the	other	hand,	scientists	admire	
unexpected	discoveries	and	ingenuity,	even	if	the	discovery	has	no	significant	
systematic	 importance	 (for	 instance,	 the	discovery	of	Neptune).	Of	course,	
their	 traditionalism	could	lead	scientists	 to	erroneous	conclusions.25	This	 is	
not	a	flawless	system;	nevertheless	Polanyi	 insists	 that	 it	 is	 the	best	attain-
able.
As	it	is	well	known,	Polanyi	was	a	severe	critic	of	the	positivist	view	of	sci-
ence,	according	to	which	the	criteria	of	truth	and	the	methodology	of	justifica-
tion	are	based	on	objective,	universally	valid,	and,	thus,	impersonal	rules.	It	
is	worth	invoking	some	additional	elements	of	Polanyi’s	anti-positivist	views	
of	 science.	 In	 contrast	 to	 positivists,	 he	 argues	 that	 there	 are	 no	objective,	
definite	 rules	 of	 either	 justification	 or	 discovery.	 Scientists’	 personal,	 tacit	
judgements	are	the	only	guide	to	scientific	truth.	Scientific	research	cannot	
be	planned	due	to	the	fact	that	the	rules	of	judging	scientific	merit	cannot	be	
fully	and	precisely	formalized.	If	the	justification	of	the	claims	of	science	are	
not	based	on	impersonal,	abstract	methodological	norms,	rather	on	tacit	rules	
formulated	by	the	community	of	scientists,	then	knowledge	cannot	be	without	
morality	and	rationality,	and	knowing	has	an	essentially	moral	character.26
It	is	clear	what	is	at	stake	in	this	debate.	Successful	planning	is	possible	in	
the	 cases	of	 tasks	which	 can	be	 strictly	 formalized.	 If	 the	 advancement	of	
science	as	well	as	rejecting	and	accepting	scientific	claims	are	not	guided	by	
impersonal,	“objective”	and	precisely	definable	theoretical	principles,	but	de-
pends	on	personal,	tacit,	elusive	and	unpredictable	judgements,	then	centrally	
directing	science	is	impossible.	Polanyi	summarizes	these	points	in	“The	Re-
public	of	Science” as	follows:
“(…)	the	methods	of	scientific	inquiry	cannot	be	explicitly	formulated	and	hence	can	be	tran-
smitted	only	in	the	same	way	as	an	art,	by	the	affiliation	of	apprentices	to	a	master.	The	authority	
of	science	is	essentially	traditional.”27
The	 standards	 of	 science	 mark	 the	 framework	 of	 scientific	 research	 (i.e.	
search	for	truth).	At	the	same	time,	scientists	are	inspired	to	break	these	rules	
by	finding	some	new,	original	and	unexpected	aspects	of	reality.	Polanyi	sum-
marizes	the	logical	connections	between	epistemological	and	moral	values	in	
the	following	way:
“The	general	foundations	of	coherence	and	freedom	in	society	may	be	regarded	as	secure	to	the	
extent	to	which	men	uphold	their	belief	in	the	reality	of	truth,	justice,	charity,	and	tolerance,	and	
accept	dedication	to	the	service	of	these	realities.	(…)	The	study	of	academic	freedom	which	we	
have	pursued	may	serve	what	is	the	decisive	point	in	the	issue	of	liberty.	It	consists	in	certain	
metaphysical	assumptions	without	which	freedom	is	logically	untenable,	and	without	the	firm	
profession	of	which	freedom	can	be	upheld	only	in	a	state	of	suspended	logic,	which	threatens	
to	collapse	at	any	moment	and	which	in	these	searching	and	revolutionary	times	cannot	fail	to	
collapse	before	long.”28
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Standards	of	 scientific	evaluation	have	another	 important	 function,	namely	
establishing	a	coherent	scientific	opinion.	Uniformity	of	scientific	standards	
and	the	common	beliefs	about	“the	nature	of	things”	provide	the	third	con-
dition	 of	 free	 science.	Without	 uniform	 standards	 the	 comparison	 between	
the	 value	 of	 discoveries	 in	 different	 fields	 (such	 as	 botany	 and	 theoretical	
physics)	would	be	impossible.	Additionally,	if	science	was	separated	by	rival	
schools	of	thought,	the	scientific	authority	which	establishes	its	public	respect	
would	be	ceased.29
Some	further	questions	must	be	answered.	Every	scientist	has	competence	in	
only	a	very	small	part	of	scientific	knowledge.	How	can	a	group	of	special-
ists	form	a	coherent	scientific	opinion	and	make	consistent	judgements	about	
such	diverse	topics	of	scientific	inquiry?	We	have	seen	that	the	main	organi-
zational	 principle	of	 free	 science	 is	 the	 self-coordination	of	 individuals	by	
mutual	adjustment.	Polanyi	emphasizes	the	importance	of	another	feature	of	
science,	namely	that	there	are	overlapping	areas	of	scientists’	special	fields.	
Although	every	scientist	can	judge	competently	only	a	small	part	of	science,	
they	can	make	judgements	 in	fields	which	are	connected	with	 their	special	
research	area.	Every	scientist	is	a	member	of	a	group	with	overlapping	com-
petences,	thus	the	whole	of	science	is	covered	by	the	network	of	experts.	The	
links	between	specialists	establish	the	coherence	of	scientific	opinion.30
The	authority	of	scientific	opinion	is	mutual.	He	says,	the	authority	“is	estab-
lished	between	 scientists,	 not	 above	 them.”31	Moreover,	 scientists	 exercise	
authority	over	the	lay	public:
“Only	 the	 discipline	 imposed	by	 an	 effective	 scientific	 opinion	 can	 prevent	 the	 adulteration	
of	science	by	cranks	and	dabblers.	(…)	Moreover,	only	a	strong	and	united	scientific	opinion	
24
Ibid.,	p.	54.
25
Polanyi	invokes	the	rejection	of	his	own	the-
ory	about	adsorption	which	later	turned	out	to	
be	 true.	He	adds:	“I	did	not	complain	about	
this	 mistaken	 exercise	 of	 authority.”	 See:	
Michael	Polanyi,	“The	Growth	of	Science	in	
Society”,	 in:	 M.	 Grene	 (ed.),	Knowing and 
Being. Essays by Michael Polanyi,	p.	78.
26
In	his	main	work,	Personal Knowledge	as	well	
as	in	other	essays,	such	as	“The	Unaccount-
able	Element	in	Science”	he	argues	very	thor-
oughly	in	favour	of	these	claims.	He	examines	
and	criticizes	the	positivist	account	of	scien-
tific	reasoning	and	justification	as	well	as	the	
limits	of	using	mathematical	formulations	of	
scientific	problems.	To	sum	up,	he	identifies	
five	 areas	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 in	 which	
indeterminacies	play	 role.	 (1)	 the	 indetermi-
nacy	 of	 empirical	 knowledge	 in	 its	 bearing	
on	reality	(2)	the	unspecifiability	of	rules	for	
establishing	true,	as	distinct	from	illusory,	co-
herence	(3)	the	indeterminacy	of	the	grounds	
on	which	a	belief	is	considered	knowledge	(4)	
the	unspecifiability	of	the	process	of	tacit	in-
tegration	by	which	knowledge	is	acquired	(5)	
the	unspecifiability	of	the	existential	changes	
involved	in	modifying	the	grounds	of	scien-
tific	judgements.	See:	Michael	Polanyi,	“The	
Unaccountable	 Element	 in	 Science”,	 in:	M.	
Grene	 (ed.),	Knowing and Being. Essays by 
Michael Polanyi,	p.	120.
27
M.	Polanyi,	“The	Republic	of	Science:	Its	Po-
litical	and	Economic	Theory”,	p.	66.
28
M.	Polanyi,	 “Foundations	of	Academic	Fre-
edom”,	pp.	47–48.
29
Ibid.,	p.	42.
30
“Indeed,	 through	 these	 overlapping	 neigh-
bourhoods	 uniform	 standards	 of	 scientific	
merit	will	prevail	over	the	entire	range	of	sci-
ence,	all	the	way	from	astronomy	to	medicine.	
(…)	Scientific	opinion	is	an	opinion	not	held	
by	 any	 single	 human	mind,	 but	 one	 which,	
split	 into	 thousands	of	fragments,	 is	held	by	
a	multitude	of	individuals,	each	of	whom	en-
dorses	the	others’	opinion	at	second	hand,	by	
relying	on	 the	consensual	 chains	which	 link	
him	 to	 all	 the	 others	 through	 a	 sequence	 of	
overlapping	 neighbourhoods.”	 M.	 Polanyi,	
“The	 Republic	 of	 Science:	 Its	 Political	 and	
Economic	Theory”,	p.	56.
31
Ibid.,	p.	56.
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imposing	the	intrinsic	value	of	scientific	progress	on	society	at	large	can	elicit	the	support	of	
scientific	inquiry	by	the	general	public.”32
An	additional	requirement	of	academic	freedom	is	the	freedom	of	academic	
appointments.	Unsurprisingly,	Polanyi	advocates	a	complete	freedom	of	sci-
entists	in	terms	of	deciding	on	appointments	at	universities,	academies,	and	
other	research	institutions.	Perhaps	his	idea	of	life-long,	permanent	appoint-
ment	of	professors	seems	old-fashioned	now,	but	he	maintains	that	this	is	an	
essential	institutional	safeguard	of	academic	freedom.	It	is	clear	that	appoint-
ment	for	life	(or	until	retirement)	provides	a	privileged	degree	of	independ-
ence.33	In	conformity	with	his	views	about	traditional	institutions,	his	analogy	
is	the	appointments	to	the	judiciary.	He	maintains	that	even	though	judges	are	
appointed	and	paid	by	the	state	(or	in	Britain,	the	Monarch),	it	does	not	affect	
their	independence	as	long	as	the	state	respects	their	freedom.34
5.
The	ideological	reasons	against	academic	freedom	have	strong	connections	
with	profound	epistemological	questions	as	well.	As	we	have	seen,	Polanyi	
states	that	the	aim	of	science	is	to	seek	the	truth,	which	is	one	of	the	most	im-
portant	(or	the	most	important)	value	of	mankind.	In	order	to	fulfil	their	goal,	
scientists	must	work	in	an	autonomous,	independent	community	and	be	free	
from	political	or	even	economic	interests.	It	is	not	hard	to	see	how	his	ideas	
are	based	on	his	commitment	to	the	view	that	science	provides	efficient	means	
for	understanding	reality.	He	interprets	totalitarian	ideologies	as	implicit	or	
explicit	denials	of	(scientific)	 truth.	It	could	seem	surprising,	since	Nazism	
and	Communism	both	declared	that	they	had	a	firm	“scientific”	basis.
Let	us	see	an	example	of	how	totalitarian	ideologies	determine	the	role	and	
nature	of	scientific	 truth.	Polanyi	quotes	Himmler’s	views	about	 investiga-
tions	into	German	pre-history.
“We	don’t	care	a	hoot	whether	this	or	something	else	was	the	real	truth	about	the	pre-history	of	
the	German	tribes.	(…)	there’s	no	earthly	reason	why	the	party	should	not	lay	down	a	particular	
hypothesis	as	the	starting	point,	even	if	it	runs	counter	to	current	scientific	opinion.	The	one	and	
only	thing	that	matters	to	us	(…)	is	to	have	ideas	of	history	that	strengthen	our	people	in	their	
necessary	national	pride.”35
This	passage	makes	clear	what	drastic	consequences	could	be	expected	if	we	
denied	scientists’	right	to	decide	what	scientific	truth	is.	Polanyi	argues	that	
denying	academic	freedom	goes	hand	in	hand	with	denying	scientific	truth:	
if	the	scientists	do	not	tell	what	is	true,	then	someone	else	will	do	that,	for	
example,	political	authorities.36	According	to	Polanyi’s	anti-positivist	episte-
mology,	the	free	cooperation	of	scientists	who	hold	the	same	beliefs	and	fol-
low	the	same	standards	is	the	only	possible	way	to	gain	scientific	knowledge	
about	reality.
Moreover,	as	we	have	seen,	denying	the	distinction	between	pure	and	applied	
science	relies	on	a	utilitarian	theory	of	values,	which	from	Polanyi’s	point	of	
view	is	equal	to	denying	objective	moral	values	altogether.	In	“Science	and	
Welfare”	he	makes	this	relation	clear:
”The	new	radically	utilitarian	valuation	of	science	rests	on	a	consistent	philosophical	backgro-
und,	borrowed	mainly	from	Marxism.	It	denies	that	pure	science,	as	distinct	from	applied	or	
technical	science,	can	exist	at	all.	Such	a	revaluation	of	science	necessarily	leads	to	a	demand	for	
the	Planning	of	Science.	If	science	is	to	serve	the	practical	needs	of	society	it	must	be	properly	
organized	for	this	purpose.	You	cannot	expect	individual	scientists,	each	pursuing	their	particular	
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
54	(2/2012)	pp.	(307–321)
P.	 Hartl,	 Michael	 Polanyi	 on	 Freedom	 of	
Science317
interests,	to	develop	science	effectively	towards	the	satisfaction	of	existing	practical	needs.	You	
must	see	to	it	therefore	that	scientists	are	placed	under	the	guidance	of	authorities	who	know	the	
needs	of	society	and	are	generally	responsible	for	safe-guarding	the	public	interest.”37
All	in	all,	Polanyi’s	argumentation	against	totalitarian	control	of	science	has	
two	aspects,	a	practical	and	a	deeper,	logical	one.	First,	planned	science	does	
not	work,	controlling	science	paralyses	scientific	development.	Advancement	
of	 science	 is	 possible	 only	 if	 scientists,	 self-coordinated	by	 their	 own	 free	
choices,	make	judgements	about	the	scientific	merits	of	theories	and	hypoth-
eses.	These	standards	of	science	are	rooted	in	tradition,	and	individuals’	vol-
untary	submission	 to	 it.	Like	 the	 traditional	rules	and	values	of	other	great	
intellectual	systems,	such	as	the	judiciary,	the	individuals’	decisions	are	never	
predetermined,	as	every	new	decision	changes	and	forms	the	tradition.
Secondly,	rejecting	academic	freedom	is	theoretically	problematic:	it	is	a	self-
defeating	 position.	 For	 if	we	 reject	 academic	 freedom,	 then	 ideologists	 or	
politicians,	not	scientists,	will	decide	what	problems	are	worthy	of	investiga-
tion	and	what	is	supposed	to	be	the	result	of	investigation.	Since	truth-seeking	
relies	on	tacit,	intuitive	judgements	of	free	explorers,	rejecting	academic	free-
dom	blocks	the	way	to	truth.	As	we	have	seen,	according	to	Polanyi’s	theory	
of	knowledge,	understanding	nature	is	possible	only	on	the	basis	of	tradition	
and	the	self-coordination	of	free	intellectuals.	Denying	academic	freedom	is	
equal	to	denying	that	the	main	goal	of	science	is	seeking	the	truth	by	means	
of	the	self-coordination	of	scientists.	Therefore,	rejecting	academic	freedom	
might	lead	to	rejecting	the	truth	itself,	and	it	will	destroy	the	theoretical	basis	
of	totalitarian	ideologies	which	declare	the	falsity	of	their	rival	ideologies.	If	
true	was	nothing	more	than	what	serves	the	Party’s	or	(supposedly)	the	pub-
lic’s	interest,	then	it	would	mean	that	there	is	no	real	truth	and	falsity.38
6.
In	the	final	section	I	consider	some	objections	against	Polanyi’s	views.	I	ar-
gue	 that	some	of	 these	objections	are	fair	and	raise	real	difficulties	against	
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Ibid.,	pp.	57–58.
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M.	Polanyi,	 “Foundations	of	Academic	Fre-
edom”,	p.	43.	The	eminent	examples	are	Ox-
ford	and	Cambridge.
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Ibid.,	p.	41.
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See:	 M.	 Polanyi,	 “Self-Government	 of	 Sci-
ence”,	p.	59.
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“For	 if	 truth	 is	 not	 real	 and	 absolute,	 then	
it	 may	 seem	 proper	 that	 public	 authorities	
should	 decide	 what	 should	 be	 called	 the	
truth.”	M.	Polanyi,	“Foundations	of	Academic	
Freedom”,	p.	47.
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M.	Polanyi,	“Science	and	Welfare”,	p.	69.
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Polanyi	 calls	 the	 Hungarian	 Revolution	 in	
October	1956	a	battle	for	the	truth	itself.	To-
tal	 and	 radical	 denying	 of	 truth	 became	un-
sustainable	in	1956.	He	quotes	the	Hungarian	
Communist,	 Miklós	 Gimes’	 edifying	 words	
to	 illuminate	 radical	 totalitarian	 thought	 as	
well	as	the	transformation	from	a	totalitarian	
viewpoint	into	normal	mentality.	Gimes	says:	
“Slowly	 we	 had	 come	 to	 believe	 (…)	 that	
there	are	two	kinds	of	truth,	that	the	truth	of	
the	Party	and	the	people	can	be	different	and	
can	be	more	important	than	the	objective	truth	
and	that	truth	and	political	expediency	are	in	
fact	 identical	 (…)	And	 so	we	 arrived	 at	 the	
outlook	(…)	which	poisoned	our	whole	pub-
lic	life,	penetrated	the	remotest	corners	of	our	
thinking,	obscured	our	vision,	paralysed	our	
critical	 faculties	 and	 finally	 rendered	 many	
of	 us	 incapable	 of	 simply	 sensing	 or	 appre-
hending	truth.	This	is	how	it	was,	it	is	no	use	
denying	it.”	Michael	Polanyi,	“The	Message	
of	 the	Hungarian	Revolution”,	 in:	M.	Grene	
(ed.),	Knowing and Being. Essays by Michael 
Polanyi,	p.	29.
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Polanyi’s	more	or	less	idealistic	ideas	about	academic	freedom.	Nevertheless,	
these	objections	fail	to	show	that	Polanyi	anti-positivist	and	anti-totalitarian	
views	are	unsupported.	They	rather	demonstrate	that	we	should	mitigate	Po-
lanyi’s	views	and	uphold	a	more	balanced	position.
The	first	obvious	objection	is	that	in	the	Soviet	Union	planned	science	was	
actually	 successful.	 Soviet	 science	 and	 engineering	were	 high-ranking	 and	
could	compete	with	“Western	science”	at	length.	Polanyi	himself	deals	with	
this	objection.39	Unsurprisingly,	in	his	reply	he	emphasizes	that	detailed	re-
search	plans	for	each	laboratory	or	university	remained	on	paper	only.	Even	
though	 there	were	 serious	political-ideological	 interventions	 into	 academic	
freedom	in	 terms	of	psychology	and	genetics,	as	well	as	 in	 terms	of	social	
sciences,	most	Soviet	mathematicians,	physicists,	chemists	followed	the	same	
standards	of	scientific	research	as	their	Western	colleagues.	According	to	Po-
lanyi,	this	is	the	main	reason	why	several	areas	of	pure	science	managed	to	
make	progress	even	during	the	darkest	times	of	totalitarianism.40
Polanyi’s	reply	is	coherent	with	his	other	views,	however,	it	seems	that	he	just	
reformulates	his	views.	A	defender	of	planned	science	might	easily	reply	that	
the	success	of	some	areas	of	science	in	the	Soviet	Union	clearly	demonstrates	
that	there	is	nothing	wrong	with	centrally	directed	science.	Moreover,	if	sci-
entists’	academic	freedom	could	remain	even	in	totalitarian	states,	then	it	is	
unclear	what	is	the	whole	point	of	Polanyi’s	criticism	of	totalitarianism.
Another,	perhaps	more	forceful	objection	calls	attention	to	the	fact	that	“ab-
solute”	freedom	and	independence	have	never	existed	in	science,	and	they	are	
not	even	worth	to	aim	for.41	Polanyi	defines	academic	freedom	as	scientists’	
freedom	to	decide	 their	own	problems	of	 inquiry.	As	he	argues,	not	allow-
ing	them	to	do	so	would	be	an	unacceptable	external	 influence	on	science.	
However,	it	is	not	hard	to	see	why	total	freedom	in	selecting	problems	and	
methods	would	be	very	dangerous,	if	it	means	that	neither	the	state	nor	any-
one	else	has	supervision	over	scientists.	Though	we	can	admit	that	the	goal	
of	pure	science	is	 to	seek	the	truth	and	gain	a	deeper	knowledge	about	 the	
nature	of	reality,	it	is	clear	that	there	must	be	other,	sometimes	more	important	
aspects	of	scientific	inquiry,	namely	moral	values.	There	are	several	morally	
objectionable	 scientific	 experiments	or	 even	areas	of	 inquiry.	A	number	of	
controversial	psychological	experiments	can	be	mentioned	for	example:	the	
Milgram-experiment,	the	Stanford	prison	experiment.	Studies	made	on	twins	
who	were	separated	at	birth	have	certainly	enlarged	our	knowledge	about	how	
we	are	shaped	by	genes	and	how	much	by	the	environment,	nevertheless	it	is	
hard	to	defend	that	this	mode	of	inquiry	was	worth	for	“scientific	truth”.	Experi-
menting	on	animals	and	stem-cell	research	are	further	obvious	examples.
It	is	safe	to	say	that	Polanyi’s	arguments	manage	to	demonstrate	that	his	con-
ception	about	academic	freedom	is	better	than	totalitarian	science.	Nonethe-
less,	these	arguments	fail	to	justify	that	free	science	in	a	Polanyian	sense	is	
the	best	possible	option.	Elitism	and	“absolute”	freedom	can	be	dangerous.	
Though	it	is	not	right	when	political	authorities	or	profit-oriented	companies	
decide	about	scientific	truth	or	academic	appointments,	a	public	control	con-
cerning	research	projects	and	examined	problems	is	needed.	Moreover,	Po-
lanyi	admits	that	pure	science	must	be	funded	by	the	state.	He	has	an	optimis-
tic	view	of	a	good	King	who	just	supports	independent	institutions,	but	does	
not	want	 to	 intervene	or	 influence	 their	work.	Of	course,	 this	view	sounds	
idealistic.	Apart	from	this	problem,	since	according	to	Polanyi	science	should	
be	a	state-funded	institution,	his	analogy	with	free	market	capitalism	can	be	
challenged.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	free	market	establishes	consumer	so-
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ciety	in	which	people’s	desires	are	manipulated	and	they	don’t	always	want	
what	 they	really	need.	That	 is	 to	say,	 free	market	could	be	flourished	even	
though	its	advancement	might	rely	on	manipulation	and	delusion,	rather	than	
seeking	the	truth.	Consequently,	Polanyi	must	admit	that	there	are	crucial	dif-
ferences	between	two	kinds	of	self-coordinated	systems,	namely	free-market	
and	scientific	research.
Furthermore,	as	regard	to	his	elitism,	Polanyi’s	epistemological	views	have	
been	criticized	in	many	respects.	I	refer	to	some	objections	offered	by	Laka-
tos	who	criticized	Polanyi	and	other	conservative	thinkers	(such	as	Toulmin	
or	Oakeshott)	by	claiming	 that	 their	epistemology	has	an	authoritarian	and	
undemocratic	flavour.	Here	I	am	able	to	offer	only	a	short	summary	of	these	
objections.
As	we	have	seen,	an	elitist	like	Polanyi	would	interpret	the	victory	of	Lysenko	
over	the	Mendelians	in	terms	of	destroying	the	norms	of	the	scientific	com-
munity.	However,	Lakatos	argues	that	these	norms	of	the	community	do	not	
guarantee	scientific	progress,	i.e.	reaching	a	more	and	more	comprehensive	
understanding	of	nature.	Consensus	among	the	scientists	and	scientific	degen-
eration	can	prevail	at	the	same	time.42
Lakatos	 states	 that	 if	 the	 decisions	 of	 a	 privileged	 elite	 are	 the	 criteria	 of	
scientific	 truth,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 scientists	 judge	 themselves,	 and	 laymen	
must	not	judge	the	scientific	elite,	then	it	can	have	dangerous	consequences.	
If	there	are	no	explicit	criteria	of	distinguishing	between	pseudo-science	and	
real	science,	or	between	progressive	research	projects	and	degenerative	ones,	
then	scientific	opinion	would	be	nothing	else	than	the	prevailing	opinion	of	
a	 community.	According	 to	 Lakatos,	 this	 is	 an	 authoritarian	 view,	 since	 it	
says	truth	is	what	the	majority	accepts	as	true.	Even	though	Polanyi	insists	
that	 there	 is	 scientific	 progress,	Lakatos	 argues,	 he	 fails	 to	 show	how	 real	
scientific	progress	could	be	achieved,	if	ultimately	we	have	nothing	else	than	
the	scientists’	inexplicable	intuitive	judgements	to	rely	on.	There	are	changes	
in	the	opinions	of	the	community,	but	how	can	we	know	that	whether	this	is	
a	real	progress?43	Lakatos	draws	the	conclusion:	we	should	separate	the	so-
ciology	and	history	of	science	from	the	rational	reconstruction	of	science.
Nevertheless,	I	believe	we	have	good	reasons	to	think	that	Polanyi’s	criticism	
of	 the	 ideological-philosophical	 foundations	of	 totalitarianism	has	valuable	
points.	He	 rightly	points	 out	 that	 denying	 academic	 freedom	 relies	upon	 a	
kind	of	pragmatist	view	of	 science	and	an	 instrumentalist	 interpretation	of	
39
M.	Polanyi,	 “Science	and	Welfare”,	pp.	83–
85.
40
He	points	out	that	there	were	attempts	by	So-
viet	scientists	to	challenge	the	Marxist	inter-
pretation	of	science.	He	invokes	academician	
Kapitza’s	 speech	 to	 the	 Soviet	Academy	 in	
1943.	He	argued	Academy	should	be	devoted	
to	“great	science”.	This	is	an	another	name	of	
pure	science	which	Polanyi	has	in	his	mind.	
Kapitza	said:	“(…)	it	is	not	right	to	insist	that	
a	scientist	should	seek	the	application	of	his	
scientific	 work	 to	 industry	 (…)	 a	 scientific	
institute	should	have	a	very	flexible	organiza-
tion.	Indeed,	in	the	course	of	creative	work	it	
is	difficult	to	look	even	one	month	ahead,	let	
alone	a	year.”	Ibid.,	p.	84.
41
I	am	very	grateful	to	Professor	William	Sweet	
for	these	comments.
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Gregory	Currie	(eds.),	Imre Lakatos: Mathe-
matics, science and epistemology. Philosophi-
cal Papers, Volume II,	Cambridge	University	
Press,	1997,	pp.	112–117.
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Imre	Lakatos,	“Understanding	Toulmin”,	 in:	
J.	Worall	&	G.	Currie	 (eds.),	 Imre Lakatos: 
Mathematics, science and epistemology. Philo-
sophical Papers, Volume II,	pp.	227–228.
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
54	(2/2012)	pp.	(307–321)
P.	 Hartl,	 Michael	 Polanyi	 on	 Freedom	 of	
Science320
moral	values.	It	is	also	worth	considering	Polanyi’s	arguments	for	the	claim	
that	the	instrumentalist	idea	is	a	form	of	moral	nihilism	which	denies	the	real-
ity	of	moral	values,	including	the	values	of	pure	science,	and	this	principle	
is	one	of	the	essential	components	of	the	ideologies	of	totalitarian	states	in	
the	 twentieth	century.	He	states	 rightly	 that	we	cannot	properly	understand	
twentieth	century	totalitarianism	unless	we	closely	examine	the	philosophical	
tendencies	which	led	to	false	and	distorted	views	about	morality	and	knowl-
edge.	In	my	view,	his	insights	are	usually	overlooked	in	current	philosophical	
discussions	about	totalitarianism.
It	is	worth	mentioning	another	important	question	which	is	related	to	discus-
sions	about	the	role	of	philosophy	in	our	society.	Polanyi	warns	that	though	
we	live	in	a	democratic	society,	the	idea	of	pure	science	might	be	put	at	risk	if	
profit	seeking	becomes	the	ultimate	value.	His	conception	of	academic	free-
dom	in	terms	of	pure	science	might	have	some	lessons	for	researches	in	hu-
manities	and	social	sciences	as	well.	For	it	is	also	a	wide-spread	opinion	that	
arts	and	humanities	(prominently	philosophy)	can	hardly	contribute	to	eco-
nomic	growth	or	the	public	welfare	of	society.	Philosophy	is	often	considered	
as	unnecessary,	since	it	is	unclear	whether	it	has	practical	benefits.	Of	course,	
this	opinion	has	serious	and	dubious	philosophical	presumptions.	The	main	
lesson	could	be	drawn	from	all	these	points	is	that	the	role	of	science	as	well	
as	philosophy	must	be	reconsidered	in	our	free	societies	as	well.
Péter Hartl
Michael Polanyi o slobodi znanosti
Sažetak
U ovome radu istražujem Polanyijeve glavne argumente za akademsku slobodu. Akademska i 
politička sloboda međusobno su blisko povezane: ako država preuzme kontrolu nad znanošću, 
to dovodi do kolapsa same slobode u cijelome društvu. Njegovi argumenti protiv totalitarizma 
oslanjaju se na njegovu anti-pozitivističku filozofiju znanosti. On definira totalitarizam kao 
poricanje akademske slobode koje se temelji na pragmatičkom poimanju znanosti i instrumen-
talističkim interpretacijama moralnih vrijednosti. Polanyijeva ideja znanosti je duhovni, idea-
listički opis zajednice slobodnih intelektualaca koji su strastveno posvećeni potrazi za istinom 
i imaju autonomnu zajednicu s vlastitim pravilima i autonomnim upravljanjem. Potraga za 
istinom radi nje same je bitan cilj znanosti, koji se može postići jedino ako znanost ostane 
slobodna od političkih, ideoloških i ekonomskih utejcaja. Tvrdim da Polanyijevi uvidi mogu 
biti relevantni i danas, kada znanost može postati instrument profitno orijentiranih praktičnih 
potreba umjesto potrage za istinom samom i kada se humanistika (uključujući filozofiju) često 
smatra nepotrebnom. 
Ključne	riječi
akademska	sloboda,	Michael	Polanyi,	čista	znanost,	znanstveni	autoritet,	samoupravljanje,	prešutne	
prosudbe,	totalitarizam,	tradicija,	istina
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Péter Hartl
Michael Polanyi über die Wissenschaftsfreiheit
Zusammenfassung
Im präsenten Artikel gehe ich Polanyis Hauptargumentation für akademische Freiheit auf den 
Grund. Die akademische und politische Freiheit sind miteinander nahe verwandt: Unterzieht 
der Staat die Wissenschaft seiner Kontrolle, endet dies im Kollaps der Freiheit selbst in der 
gesamten Gesellschaft. Polanyis Begründung gegen den Totalitarismus stützt sich auf dessen 
antipositivistische Philosophie der Wissenschaft. Er diagnostiziert den Totalitarismus als Ver-
sagung der akademischen Freiheit, die auf dem pragmatischen Blickpunkt der Wissenschaft als 
auch der instrumentalistischen Interpretation der Moralwerte basiert. Polanyis Wissenschafts-
vorstellung ist eine spirituelle, idealistische Schilderung einer Gemeinschaft freier Intellektu-
eller, die sich der Suche nach Wahrheit glutvoll gewogen zeigt und über eine autonome Com-
munity mit eigenen Regeln sowie autonomer Verwaltung verfügt. Die Erkundung der Wahrheit 
um ihrer selbst willen repräsentiert das essenzielle Vorhaben der Wissenschaft, welches sich 
allein unter Bewahrung ihrer Independenz von politischen, ideologischen bzw. wirtschaftlichen 
Einflüssen zuwege bringen lässt. Ich halte dafür, Polanyis Einblicke hätten auch heutzutage Re-
levanzpotenzial, zu der Zeit, wenn sich die Wissenschaft auf ein Werkzeug des profitorientierten 
praktischen Begehrens reduzieren könnte, anstatt nach der Wahrheit selbst zu fahnden, und die 
Geisteswissenschaften (Philosophie inbegriffen) gehäuft als entbehrlich abgestempelt werden.
Schlüsselwörter
akademische	Freiheit,	Michael	Polanyi,	reine	Wissenschaft,	wissenschaftliche	Autorität,	Selbstkoor-
dination,	stillschweigende	Urteile,	Totalitarismus,	Tradition,	Wahrheit
Péter Hartl
Michael Polanyi sur la liberté de la science
Résumé
Dans cet essai, j’examine les principaux arguments de Polany pour la liberté académique. La 
liberté académique et politique sont étroitement liées : si l’Etat prend le contrôle de la science, 
cela conduira à l’effondrement de la liberté elle-même dans toute la société. Ses arguments 
contre le totalitarisme reposent sur sa philosophie anti-positiviste de la science. Il diagnostique 
le totalitarisme comme un refus de la liberté académique fondé sur une conception pragmatique 
de la science et une interprétation instrumentaliste des valeurs morales. L’idée de la science 
de Polany est une description spirituelle, idéaliste, d’une communauté d’intellectuels libres, 
passionnément dédiés à la recherche de la vérité, et qui ont une communauté avec ses propres 
règles et une direction autonome. La recherche de la vérité pour elle-même est l’objectif essen-
tiel de la science, ce qui peut être accompli uniquement si elle demeure libre des influences po-
litiques, idéologiques et économiques. J’affirme que les visions de Polany peuvent toujours être 
pertinentes aujourd’hui, alors que la science peut devenir un instrument des besoins pratiques 
orientés vers le profit au lieu de chercher la vérité elle-même, et alors que les sciences humaines 
(y compris la philosophie) sont souvent considérées comme inutiles.
Mots-clés
liberté	académique,	Michael	Polanyi,	science	pure,	autorité	scientifique,	auto-coordination,	jugements	
tacites,	totalitarisme,	tradition,	vérité
